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Integration and Disintegration: The
Attempted Incorporation of Malta
into the United Kingdom in the 1950s
Simon C. Smith
Existing interpretations stress that challenges to British interests elsewhere in the Mediter-
ranean were central to Britain’s initial support for Maltese incorporation into the United
Kingdom. Through a close examination of official British records, this article demon-
strates, by contrast, that Britain saw integration primarily as a means of solving the
complex constitutional and financial problems which had impeded smooth Anglo-
Maltese relations since the restoration of responsible government in 1947. Equally, the
waning of British enthusiasm for integration can be traced to concerns about the costs
of the scheme, especially in the face of Maltese insistence on ‘economic equivalence’,
rather than to any downgrading of Malta’s importance in the wake of the 1956 Suez
debacle. The Maltese premier Dom Mintoff ’s insistence on equivalence as the price of inte-
gration and Britain’s equal determination to resist such claims provide the key to explain-
ing the scheme’s demise. Ultimately, Malta followed a more conventional path to
independence within the Commonwealth by September 1964.
The attempted integration of the island colony of Malta into the United Kingdom in
the 1950s is noteworthy on account of its uniqueness in the history of British decolo-
nisation. Although a number of other colonies were considered for incorporation into
the United Kingdom – Gibraltar and the smaller Caribbean islands for instance – no
other scheme of integration was pursued so systematically, or came so close to suc-
ceeding. While comparable French island colonies had received representation in
Paris as overseas de´partements from 1946,1 no similar experiment was attempted by
Britain, which favoured exporting its constitutional practices rather than integrating
the colonial periphery with the imperial metropole. The reasons for Britain’s departure
in the case of Malta from its established approach to the problems of constitution-
making in the colonies are much debated. By contrast with interpretations which
suggest that challenges to Britain’s position elsewhere in the Mediterranean
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underpinned its initial support for integration, the principal determinant of policy
would appear to be imperial pride at Malta’s expression of loyalty to the British con-
nection, coupled with acceptance that Maltese dependency on the metropole would
preclude a conventional path to full independence. The resort to integration, more-
over, was not so much a reflection of changing strategic priorities in favour of
Malta, as a recognition on the part of Britain that the constitutional arrangements
put in place at the end of the Second World War had failed to create the stability
necessary to preserve Britain’s continuing defence interests on the island.
Equally, the reasons for initial Maltese backing for integration require reassess-
ment. Rather than representing an effort on the part of the Malta Labour Party
to loosen the grip of the Catholic Church through closer association with Protestant
Britain, it constituted an attempt not only to raise living standards through the
extension of the welfare state to Malta, but also to afford the island protection
from any future changes in British defence dispositions in the Mediterranean.
Britain’s unwillingness to underwrite such a potentially expensive commitment
lies at the heart of the ultimate failure of integration and is, indeed, more significant
than any propensity on the part of Britain to reassess its overseas responsibilities
following the 1956 Suez debacle. Although changes in British defence policy, the
origins of which pre-dated the Suez crisis, played an important role in precipitating
the collapse of integration, progress towards implementing the scheme had already
stalled by the time of the publication of the controversial 1957 Defence White Paper.
The demise of integration, culminating in a declaration of a state of emergency
and the imposition of direct rule, represented an ignominious end to a scheme
which had attracted the support of politicians at the highest levels in both
Britain and Malta.
I
The idea of Maltese integration was first broached by Mabel Strickland, editor of the
Times of Malta and daughter of the former Maltese prime minister, Lord Gerald
Strickland. In an editorial of April 1943, she wrote:
This war has shown that Malta is as much a part of Britain as Portsmouth or
Croydon. The one tolerable practical solution to Malta’s constitutional and econ-
omic post-war problems then would be full political unity with Britain. . ..Let
Malta be a county of England, as an integral part of the United Kingdom represented
in Parliament at Westminster, and enjoying local government; with all the advan-
tages and responsibilities that this would entail.2
Although Strickland retreated from these ideas lest they inflicted damage on Malta’s
Catholic identity, integration was taken up by her principal political opponent, the
Malta Labour Party (MLP) leader, Dom Mintoff. Integration, which made its first
appearance in an election manifesto in 1950, became a key aspect of party policy.
MLP success at the 1955 general election allowed Mintoff actively to pursue his inte-
grationist ideas.
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R. F. Holland seeks to explain the appeal of integration to Mintoff with reference to
the Labour leader’s antipathy for the Catholic Church in Malta. ‘[I]t was as a weapon
to break the social power of that institution that integration with a Protestant mother-
land held its real attraction for Mintoff ’, he argues.3 Although Dennis Austin recog-
nises the economic draw of integration, he focuses on Mintoff ’s wish to cement
support among the dockyard workers. Integration with Britain opened the prospect
of insulating this core constituency against future reductions in British defence expen-
diture and offered the prospect of tangible benefits, not least an increase in wages.4
Also focusing on the Maltese workers whose livelihood was bound up with the
British defence establishment, J. M. Pirotta observes that ‘[a]ny proposal which
appeared not only to guarantee the British connection – but also employment at
British rates – was bound to win their support.’5 In addition, Austin and Pirotta
see Mintoff ’s sponsorship of integration as a means of removing Malta’s colonial
status in the context of the island’s perceived inability to survive economically as a
completely separate entity.6 Such pragmatism, coupled with a politician’s eye for con-
solidating his support base, doubtless played a part in Mintoff ’s thinking. Equally,
while he clearly felt enmity towards the Church,7 a sentiment which was wholeheart-
edly reciprocated by the ecclesiastical authorities, his policy derived from a more posi-
tive source than simple anti-clericalism. The key determinant in Mintoff ’s sponsorship
of closer association was the prospect of achieving ‘economic equivalence’ through the
extension of the social benefits enjoyed in Britain to Malta.
Commenting on the future status of Malta in April 1954, the secretaries of state for
the home department and the colonies, Sir David Maxwell Fyfe and Oliver Lyttelton,
observed that Mintoff was ‘more concerned with economic realities than with ques-
tions of prestige’.8 Outlining Mintoff ’s policy, Maxwell Fyfe and Lyttelton explained
that ‘[h]e advocates some form of closer association with the United Kingdom, and
seems prepared to face a diminution in political autonomy, and the application of
United Kingdom rates of taxation, provided Malta gets in return United Kingdom
social services and rates of pay’. Mintoff was thought to favour a position for Malta
similar to that of Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom. Accounting for Mint-
off ’s apparent willingness to accept a reduction in the powers of the Maltese legislative
assembly, especially in the sphere of finance, Maxwell Fyfe and Lyttelton remarked: ‘It
is apparently his view that the practical advantages to the Maltese economy would
more than compensate for the derogation from local autonomy.’ Assessing the ration-
ale behind Mintoff ’s plan, moreover, a Colonial Office official recorded that ‘[h]is pro-
posal of economic integration is a long term one and would be independent in any rise
or fall in Malta’s strategic values.’9 Mintoff ’s decisive victory in the Maltese general
election of February 1955 provided him with a popular mandate to pursue his integra-
tionist scheme.
During preliminary talks in June 1955, Mintoff emphasised that there should be a
plan whereby wages and social services in Malta would be ‘raised simultaneously over
an agreed period’.10 In formal proposals submitted to the British government, Mintoff
made clear that his conception of integration involved not merely the extension of
British constitutional norms, including parliamentary representation, to Malta, but
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also parity in wages and social services with the United Kingdom.11 While he recog-
nised that this could not be achieved immediately and would require a transitional
period, he underlined that the Maltese ‘adhered to the British model of the Welfare
State’. Referring to Mintoff ’s constitutional proposals, the governor of Malta, Sir
Robert Laycock, noted that ‘[t]hey are less interested in high-sounding titles for
Maltese officials than in the introduction of a Welfare State on the British pattern
into Malta as soon as possible’.12 Although Mintoff accepted that Britain should
receive the product of Maltese direct taxation in return, Laycock remained sceptical,
pointing out that incomes in Malta were so low that taxation would be relatively
light. Moreover, he expected Maltese families to receive exemptions, as well as substan-
tial benefits in the form of family allowances, on grounds of the number of children.
‘In short’, the governor declared, ‘the proposal for the introduction of British social
services into Malta, with the single quid pro quo of the United Kingdom taking
Maltese direct taxation, is simply a means of securing a large and continuous flow
of United Kingdom funds into Malta.’
Drawing parallels with the French overseas de´partements, Oxford don Kenneth
Robinson, who had been asked to comment on Mintoff ’s proposals, cautioned that
‘once considerations of status are removed, the essential dynamic in “integration” is
pressure for parity of social services and particularly social security benefits’.13 In an
article published shortly after giving this advice, Robinson argued that, above all,
incorporation into France was acceptable to the local leaders of the de´partements
because ‘it was assumed that integration would bring about equality of social services
with France’.14 Not surprisingly, the French de´partements came to enjoy vastly higher
living standards than their independent neighbours through the transfer of the social
welfare system enjoyed by metropolitan France to the periphery. Robert Aldrich and
John Connell have gone so far as to record that ‘the economic concessions have been so
substantial that, in most respects, any semblance of a self-reliant economic organis-
ation has long since disappeared’.15 Indeed, the ‘transfer economy’ which has grown
up in the de´partements and the territoires d’outre mer has come to represent a consider-
able cost to the French economy.16 A similar transfusion of funds from the metropole
was a key objective for Mintoff.
As deputy prime minister in the government of Paul Boffa (1947–50), Mintoff had
pressed for Malta’s participation in the American-sponsored European Recovery Pro-
gramme, or Marshall Aid, to the point of splitting the MLP on the issue. During the
integration negotiations, he was equally intent upon securing external funds for the
development of Malta. In talks on the level of British economic assistance for the
financial year 1956–57, for instance, he rejected the Colonial Office’s ceiling of £5
million. Appealing directly to the British prime minister, Sir Anthony Eden, Mintoff
warned that ‘this unilateral imposition would make the existence of my Government
extremely precarious, it would wreck all prospects of Integration, and make impossible
government of the Island by democratic methods’.17 In subsequent talks with Gover-
nor Laycock, Mintoff reiterated that a £5 million limit would make further progress
towards integration ‘impossible’ since it would involve ‘politically unacceptable con-
sequences, especially unemployment’.18 While Mintoff agreed to resume negotiations
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on the basis of £7.5 million over 18 months, coupled with the provision of a British
commission to assess Malta’s financial needs, his insistence on ‘economic equivalence’
with the United Kingdom proved an insuperable barrier to progress.
Referring to Mintoff in early 1956, the colonial administration in Malta recorded:
‘He is overwhelmed with a sense of being discriminated against and his most
sincere principal objective is to get the Maltese recognised as worth as much in pay,
prestige and other standards as the Englishmen.’19 Although Mintoff had initially
favoured ‘absolute parity’, this was refined to the achievement of equivalence over
an unspecified period. In the Maltese legislative assembly, he explained that his con-
ception of future relations between the two countries implied ‘a willingness on the
part of Britain to provide Malta with the funds and physical means required to
reach the average living standards enjoyed in Britain’.20 Towards the end of 1956,
the secretary of state for colonies, Alan Lennox-Boyd, retorted: ‘the emphasis has
been increasingly on the obligations of Her Majesty’s Government and decreasingly
on the contribution of the Maltese people, and they are now publicly pledged to
reject integration unless the principle of equivalence is conceded’.21 During further
talks in February 1957, Mintoff spelt out his conception of equivalence: the attainment
within ten years of comparable health, educational and social services; equivalent
wages and salaries of government and imperial employees within the same timeframe;
the creation of opportunities for industrial development; and ‘the acceptance of finan-
cial responsibility by the British Government to deal with the result of any unemploy-
ment caused directly by U.K. Government action’.22 ‘In other words,’ observed
Colonial Office minister, Lord Perth, wryly, ‘give a blank cheque.’23 Mintoff later
asserted that equivalence in social services and government wages and salaries
should be achieved regardless of improvements in productivity.24 Justifying this
stance to the British premier, Harold Macmillan, Mintoff contended: ‘Once the
Maltese people agree to undertake the same tax and other burdens of citizenship,
they expect to be given the same social treatment and to share the same social
benefits.’25 Britain viewed integration from a markedly different perspective.
In the estimation of R. F. Holland, strategic concerns were paramount in initial
British support for integration. Referring to the uncertainties following the loss of
the Suez base in 1954 and the terrorist campaign launched against the British presence
in Cyprus in the same year, Holland argues that ‘the prospect of making Valletta – the
finest natural harbour in Southern Europe suitable for military purposes – into a
“home” port on a permanent basis held a clear-cut appeal’.26 In a similar vein,
Stephen Howe contends that the ‘actual or threatened loss of bases in the eastern Medi-
terranean meant that Malta might become, no longer a connecting link in the British
defence system, but its front line’.27 Concern that a rejection of Mintoff ’s ideas risked
turning him towards the radical nationalism of Nasser’s Egypt or even adopting the
extreme measures of Britain’s enemies in Cyprus, adds Howe, was ‘a major factor,
perhaps the major factor, in Britain’s surprising willingness to pursue integration’.
Nevertheless, the weight of documentary evidence suggests that Britain saw
integration primarily as a means of solving the complex constitutional and financial
problems which had impeded smooth Anglo-Maltese relations since the restoration
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of responsible government in 1947. If defence interests played a part in British
decision-making, it was in this context. Indeed, it was endogenous considerations –
the malfunctioning of post-war constitutional arrangements, rather than exogenous
ones, challenges to British interests in Egypt and Cyprus – that underpinned Britain’s
initial support for integration.
II
In line with pre-war arrangements, the 1947 constitution had at its heart a division of
powers known as dyarchy. Responsible to an elected legislative assembly, the Maltese
cabinet managed local issues while the colonial government continued to hold sway
over reserved matters such as defence, civil aviation and nationality. In keeping
with its 1921 predecessor, the 1947 constitution represented an attempt to respond
to legitimate Maltese demands for self-determination, while at the same time preser-
ving British imperial interests. The suspension, and subsequent annulment, of the
1921 constitution by the early 1930s, nevertheless, hardly provided a promising pre-
cedent. Indeed, the difficulties of operating a dyarchical system of government soon
re-surfaced.
Within months of the promulgation of the post-war constitution, the newly elected
Malta government sought financial assistance towards food subsidies. Drawing consti-
tutional conclusions from this request, the head of the Colonial Office’s Mediterranean
department, J. S. Bennett, observed that the Maltese were ‘asking for something which
is incompatible with self-government as hitherto conceived’.28 Predicting the break-
down of the constitution, he added: ‘I doubt personally whether Malta can be run
as a self-contained economic and financial unit, since its economy depends so
much on external factors, and since it is so tiny.’ Bennett blamed the Maltese them-
selves for exacerbating Malta’s inherent problems: ‘Politically, since the split of the
Labour Party in 1949, they have fallen short of their self-governing responsibilities
by failing to throw up a strong majority Government capable of getting to grips
with the country’s finances.’29 Another official predicted: ‘The day is not far off
when we shall have to consider whether the almost certain financial assistance
which Malta will expect of us will not involve some modification of her present con-
stitutional status.’30 For Nationalist Party leader and Maltese prime minister,
Dr Giorgio Borg Olivier, Malta’s destiny lay in the achievement of dominion status.
The term dominion had been coined in 1907 to reflect the growing political matur-
ity of the colonies of European settlement. By the 1950s dominion status had come to
imply full self-government within the Commonwealth. In pursuit of his objective,
Borg Olivier requested the transfer of responsibility for Malta from the Colonial
Office to the Commonwealth Relations Office.31 The secretary of state for colonies,
Oliver Lyttelton, rejected the Maltese premier’s plea on the grounds that Malta’s pos-
ition as a fortress colony necessarily imposed restrictions on self-government. He
added that Malta was neither a sufficiently sizeable territory nor qualified financially
or economically to become a fully self-governing member of the Commonwealth.32
Instead, he proposed to transfer Malta from the Colonial Office to the Home Office
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which already held jurisdiction over the broadly comparable territories of the Channel
Islands and the Isle of Man. Ruminating further on Malta’s future constitutional devel-
opment, the secretaries of state for the home department and the colonies also
suggested the appointment of a royal commission to examine the workings of existing
constitutional arrangements. With this proposal, Maxwell Fyfe and Lyttelton were
tacitly recognising the failure of the 1947 constitution to provide a stable basis for
the governance and future development of Malta. ‘Basically, the trouble is that we
have tried to give complete self-government in internal affairs (including finance) to
a territory which does not, and probably never will, have a viable economy’, they
conceded.33
The Colonial Office itself revealed a growing disenchantment with existing arrange-
ments. Bennett’s successor at the Mediterranean department, W. A. Morris, identified
‘the gap in the constitution’ which arose from the fact that ‘some actions of the Imper-
ial Government under the dyarchy require co-operation of the Maltese side, without
machinery of enforcement’.34 Morris’s immediate superior, Assistant Under-Secretary
Sir John Martin, was still more forthright. ‘A diarchy’, he observed, ‘is an uneasy form
of government and it can only work if there are good personal relations and a spirit of
give and take. The latter is conspicuously absent on the side of the Maltese Ministers,
whose methods of dealing with H.M.G. are those of a Levantine carpet-seller.’35 The
defeat of Borg Olivier by Mintoff in the Maltese general election of February 1955 pro-
vided Britain with the opportunity to put its relationship with Malta on a different
footing through support for the new prime minister’s integrationist agenda.
Despite concerns about Mintoff ’s temperament, which prompted one Colonial
Office official to describe him as a ‘psychological case. . .quite incapable of appreciating
a different view’,36 he was increasingly perceived as Malta’s best hope for providing
effective government. While he accepted that Mintoff could be ‘difficult, hot-headed
and even rude’, the secretary of state for colonies, Arthur Creech Jones, insisted: ‘I
see no reason to despair of turning his undoubted abilities into constructive chan-
nels.’37 ‘For all his wild and anti-British talk’, echoed Sir John Martin, ‘I should
expect him to be a more effective P.M. than Dr. Borg Olivier.’38 ‘Mr. Mintoff, as
Prime Minister, would at least get something done’, concurred J. S. Bennett.39
Mintoff ’s vision of Maltese integration into the United Kingdom soon received power-
ful backing.
Reiterating the widely held view that Malta could aspire neither to independent
nationhood nor to membership of the Commonwealth, Alan Lennox-Boyd told the
cabinet that ‘she must look to some form of closer association with a stronger
power’.40 If the British government dismissed the idea of integration, he warned,
Malta might seek closer association with Italy. ‘Such a development would be
gravely embarrassing, especially at a time when Cypriots were agitating for union
with Greece’, he added. In cabinet discussions, there was much support for Lennox-
Boyd’s position, some form of closer association being accepted as ‘inevitable’. Never-
theless, concern was articulated on the issue of Maltese representation at Westminster.
In particular, ministers feared that a Maltese lobby might hold the balance of power,
especially at times when the respective strengths of the two main parties were
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comparable. In order to resolve the many issues raised by integration, the calling of a
formal conference, modelled on the round table conferences convened to discuss
Indian constitutional development in the inter-war years, was suggested. Shortly
after this discussion, the foreign secretary, Harold Macmillan, told Eden that ‘at this
moment in our history the voluntary and patriotic desire of Malta to join us is some-
thing we ought not to repel. Centrifugal forces are very strong at the moment. Let us
cherish any centripetal movement that we can find.’41 The Colonial Office, moreover,
emphasised that successful integration held out the prospect that ‘political, social and
economic problems would in future be dealt with in a new spirit of hopefulness and
realism, instead of in the spirit of rather sullen frustration that has been evident
before’.42 Such pragmatic sentiments were more significant in driving integration
forward than any sense of residual debt to Malta on account of its war-time role in
opposing the Axis powers.43
The Malta Round Table Conference, which included such luminaries as the former
Labour prime minister, Clement Attlee, and the Liberal leader, Clement Davies, con-
vened in September 1955. By the end of the year it had produced its report, the central
finding of which was that representation for Malta at Westminster was ‘practicable and
reasonable’.44 In an interview given in retirement, Lennox-Boyd admitted: ‘I was
getting more and more pro-integrationist, with Malta MP’s to be included in
Westminster, and this report clinched it.’45 During the deliberations themselves, the
chairman, the lord chancellor, Sir David Maxwell Fyfe (now Lord Kilmuir), informed
Eden that the idea of parliamentary representation was held with ‘varying degrees of
enthusiasm’ by the members of the conference. Explaining why the sceptics were won
round, however, Kilmuir divulged that ‘they are convinced that none of the alternative
proposals for constitutional reform seemed likely to attract majority support in Malta
and thus to result in the radical and sustained improvement in Anglo-Maltese
relations necessary to ensure our defence interests in the future’.46 As a safeguard,
the Malta Round Table Conference stipulated that it was for the Maltese people to
demonstrate ‘clearly and unmistakably’ their support for Mintoff ’s proposals.47
With this in mind, a referendum on integration was held in February 1956. Its
staging served to heighten tensions between the Catholic Church and the Maltese
government.
Seeking to underline his independence from the Church, Mintoff had declined to
make the traditional call on the archbishop of Malta on taking office. For his part,
Archbishop Michael Gonzi was deeply suspicious of Mintoff. As early as 1945 he
expressed concern at the ‘growth of Left-Wing extremism on the Island’, describing
Mintoff as ‘really a Communist’.48 Five years later, with Mintoff firmly established
as leader of the Malta Labour Party, the archbishop once more characterised him as
‘an extreme Left Wing Socialist’.49 Gonzi’s hostility towards Mintoff translated itself
into a determination to preserve the influence and prestige of the Church in the
face of the secularising tendencies of the MLP government. He was particularly con-
cerned that closer association between Britain and Malta would involve ‘an increased
seepage of “advanced” and possibly anti-clerical notions into the Maltese’.50 ‘At this
present juncture’, admitted Laycock, ‘the Archbishop undoubtedly fears and mistrusts
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Mr. Mintoff whom he regards as a dangerous atheist and enemy of the Catholic
Church.’51 Not surprisingly, he mobilised the Church to oppose the referendum,
even publicly calling for its postponement.52 Despite the opposition of the Church,
Mintoff, with nearly three-quarters of the votes cast in favour of integration, appeared
to have achieved the ‘clear and unmistakable’ endorsement recommended by the
report of the Malta Round Table Conference. On closer inspection, however, the
result seemed considerably less decisive. Although the percentage voting against was
relatively low, the very high abstention rate meant that less than half of the total elec-
torate (44.24 per cent) actually voted in favour of integration.
The inconclusive referendum result clearly did little to assist the achievement of
integration. Shortly after the poll, the secretary of state for Scotland, James Stuart,
remarked: ‘The people of Malta are divided and I am assured that they have not the
slightest idea as to what the plan involves.’53 He even threatened to resign over the
issue, justifying this position with the comment: ‘I cannot force myself to believe
that anyone has any right to wield powers without responsibility – which is what
we seem to be in danger of offering the Maltese.’ The cabinet colonial policy commit-
tee, moreover, was informed of a growing feeling in the Conservative Party against the
integration proposals, a development which had been fed by the unflattering report
produced by Tory MPs who had been invited by the Maltese government to observe
the conduct of the referendum.54 Referring to Eden’s demeanour following the refer-
endum on Maltese integration, the leader of the Opposition, Hugh Gaitskell, recorded:
‘He seemed to be very nervous about the Back Benchers and to be by no means sure of
his own mind in these matters.’55 Lennox-Boyd was also reported by Gaitskell to be
‘awfully cautious and, again, frightened of the Back Benchers’. Although concerns
were clearly growing in Conservative ranks, reservations about integration can be
identified from the outset.
Assessing the merits and demerits of integration in April 1954, the secretaries of
state for the colonies (Lyttelton) and the home department (Maxwell Fyfe) had com-
mented that ‘such a system which has some resemblance to the Union Franc¸aise56 has
the inherent defect that the Members elected from these territories soon lose touch and
influence with their constituents and have little or nothing to contribute in the day to
day life of Parliament at Westminster’.57 The two secretaries of state also stressed that it
would ‘indeed be a farce if on such a subject as commercial television in the United
Kingdom, the balance of power, as might well have, rested with Maltese
Members’.58 Focusing on the transformation in military technology ushered in by
the development of thermo-nuclear weapons, J. S. Bennett questioned whether ‘a
base on a small congested island within easy range of enemy aircraft is not now an ana-
chronism’. Following through the logic of his argument, he remarked: ‘if after 150
years the Navy now has little further use for Malta, it would seem an odd moment
to choose to link the Island permanently with this country by some form of incorpor-
ation’.59 The strongest arguments against integration, however, came from the
Treasury which fretted over the potential costs of the scheme.
Second Secretary Sir Herbert Brittain underscored Treasury reservations by con-
trasting the positions of Malta and Northern Ireland. With regard to the latter, he
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insisted, ‘one is dealing with people of our own standards of living, and, equally
important, there is a determination in Northern Ireland to make a substantial contri-
bution to the Imperial Exchequer’.60 ‘None of these elements is present in the case of
Malta’, he added, ‘and any suggestion that U.K. social services should be extended to
Malta would impose a burden on the U.K. Exchequer which seems to be quite unac-
ceptable.’ Subsequently, the Treasury estimated the costs of extending British social
services and scales of expenditure to Malta at £10 million per annum,61 which in
turn stimulated fears that other colonial territories would seek similarly favourable
treatment.62
Concerns about the repercussions of Maltese integration on the wider empire had
already been raised by the cabinet secretary, Sir Norman Brook. Concentrating on the
constitutional aspects of the scheme, he speculated that once Malta’s right to represen-
tation at Westminster had been conceded other smaller colonial territories would seek
the same status. ‘We should then be headed’, he complained, ‘towards a Parliamentary
Assembly representing, not the United Kingdom, but “the United Kingdom and Colo-
nies”.’63 In Brook’s opinion, what the Maltese were really seeking was an assurance that
their economy would be made viable. In which case, he concluded, ‘is there not much
to be said for trying to do a deal on “money”, which appeals to men of all Parties in
Malta and creates no constitutional precedents?’64 In an attempt to provide an appro-
priate status short of integration to those colonial territories deemed incapable of full
self-government, the Colonial Office produced the concept of ‘statehood’. Territories
falling into this category would enjoy self-government in internal affairs while remain-
ing dependent on Britain for defence, foreign relations, security and financial stab-
ility.65 Despite this constitutional sleight hand on the part of the Colonial Office,
the lord chancellor, Lord Kilmuir, remained apprehensive lest the example of a com-
mitment to raise Malta’s standards of social services and wages to British levels would
encourage other small colonies to press for the same benefits.66 Equally, he called
attention to the possibility that preferential treatment for Malta might prompt
Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales to request greater financial assistance, as well
as reviving demands for separate Scottish and Welsh parliaments. In subsequent
cabinet discussions,67 ministers debated the feasibility of denying Maltese members
full voting rights, as well as questioning whether the concession of parliamentary rep-
resentation necessarily incurred the obligation to raise Maltese wages and social ser-
vices to British levels. As regards the latter point, the financial secretary to the
Treasury, Henry Brooke, strongly opposed any suggestion of according Malta equality
in economic standards with those of the United Kingdom.
Eden himself had growing doubts about Mintoff ’s integration scheme, recalling that
‘tensions on the island had their consequences at home, where a number of Govern-
ment supporters in Parliament showed increasing reluctance to accept Maltese
representation at Westminster’.68 While Eden resisted the temptation to delay
parliamentary discussion of the round table report, the decision was taken to ask
the Commons to take note of, rather than formally endorse, its findings. Indeed,
Tory misgivings about integration strained the normally good relations between
Lennox-Boyd and the Conservative backbench Commonwealth committee.69 It was
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left to opposition Labour MPs to voice the strongest support for integration when the
concept was debated on 26 March 1956.70
Aneurin Bevan, former Labour health minister and member of the Malta Round
Table Conference, emphasised that it was ‘much more congenial to hear of some
Colony wishing to set up its home under the paternal roof than to set up house on
its own’. Striking a pragmatic note, Bevan told fellow MPs that ‘we are not merely
asking ourselves whether we could agree to a novel constitutional development, but
if we rejected it what sort of Government. . .we would be asked to create in Malta in
its stead’. Another Labour member of the conference, Richard Crossman, stressed
that ‘[i]f we were to turn down flat the demand for integration, the demand for inde-
pendence would be far stronger in Malta and not less strong.’ He also chided voices of
caution on the Conservative benches. ‘I am really rather baffled’, he condescended,
how those who are interested in the Empire can look so carefully and find so many
difficulties about accepting something which will tie. . .the one surviving stronghold
of British power in the Mediterranean to this country. These gentlemen on the other
side of the House, who lecture us about the requirements of Imperial strategy, are
not prepared to stretch a constitutional point in order to save for us the strategic
stronghold of Malta.
Crossman also stated that ‘[t]he reason for the demand for integration is not because
the Maltese people feel British. It is because there is no other way for them to achieve
the full rights of citizens except as citizens of the United Kingdom.’ Earlier in the
debate, Roy Jenkins, Labour MP for Birmingham Stechford, had baldly stated: ‘We
cannot make a Dominion out of a dockyard, and that is what the position would
be.’ Former secretary of state for colonies in the Attlee government, James Griffiths,
raised the chilling prospect that rejection of integration would trigger a campaign
for Maltese independence since Britain would have ‘blocked up all the roads to any-
thing like political equality with the people of this country’. Two days after the
debate, Mintoff formally acknowledged the support of Labour MPs. In a letter to
their leader, Hugh Gaitskell, Mintoff gushed: ‘The people of Malta in general and in
particular the Malta Labour Party will never forget how, in this decisive hour of
their history, the British Labour Party under your leadership have valiantly and
solidly stood up for them.’71 The Conservative side of the House, nevertheless,
showed itself to be considerably less enthusiastic about integration.72
In a statement appended to the report of the Malta Round Table Conference, Tory
MPs Kenneth Pickthorn and John Scott Maclay had already opposed Maltese Members
of Parliament on the grounds that ‘[t]hey will have equality of function with all other
Members of Parliament at Westminster, but will not have equality of responsibility:
they will have no responsibility to their Maltese constituents for Maltese domestic
affairs, including taxation, which will remain with the Maltese Parliament’.73 Referring
to the result of the referendum on integration in the parliamentary debate on the
round table report, Pickthorn emphasised that ‘whatever else may be said about the
result, what cannot be said is that it was clear and unmistakable’. He also argued
that integration involved the ‘risk of Church versus State controversy’ in Malta. He
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was particularly concerned that such a controversy could provoke anti-British senti-
ment. ‘Anything which we should do’, he warned, ‘which would cause the risk of an
anti-British agitation complicating and complicated by the Church versus State con-
troversy is, in my judgement, the very worst thing, short of extreme physical disaster,
that could happen to Malta.’ Maclay himself asserted that ‘because there is no immedi-
ate obvious solution to a constitutional problem or any other problem, because one is
in a negative position, it does not mean that it is right to jump into a positive position
with positive action, if the dangers of that positive action are considerable’. In a similar
vein, the Tory MP for Dorset South, Viscount Hinchingbrooke, expressed concern that
‘[i]f we grant something too soon which does not represent the real feelings of the
people of Malta, and they are disappointed with the result, the danger is much
greater’, while his colleague, William Teeling, dwelt on the possibility of Malta provid-
ing a precedent for the other colonial territories. ‘If we go on indefinitely in this way,’
he insisted, ‘we shall reach a stage where a number of representatives from the
Colonies might make a serious difference to this country at a General Election.’ As
regards the domestic repercussions, of integration, Conservative MP for Wimbledon,
Cyril Black, fretted that the Malta proposals risked ‘bringing those issues of religious
controversy back into the politics of this country’.
While there were notable Tories who did come out in favour of integration, for
example Walter Elliott who had participated in the Malta Round Table Conference,74
the lack of support for integration from the Conservative benches was palpable. As
we have seen, a range of arguments were used to justify scepticism towards the
policy. One underlying political objection, however, was the fear that it would
benefit the Labour Party. As Macmillan had already noted with respect to Maltese
parliamentary representation: ‘The trouble is that I suppose it will mean 3 Labour
seats.’75 With parliamentary qualms, not least among his own supporters, in mind,
Eden announced that the part of the integration bill relating to Maltese representation
in the Commons would be brought into operation ‘only if and when the Maltese
people have shown their desire for it in a General Election following the dissolution
of the Maltese Legislative Assembly’.76 While doubts within the Conservative Party
unquestionably played a part, the reasons for the demise of integration remain
controversial.
III
Stephen Howe suggests that it was the crisis following Egyptian leader Gamal Abdul
Nasser’s nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company in July 1956 which precipitated
the ultimate defeat of integration. The British fleet despatched to Egypt to reverse
nationalisation sailed from Malta. The abject failure of the venture, coupled with
doubts about whether a similar expedition could be mounted in the future, argues
Howe, undermined Malta’s perceived importance: ‘the Suez venture, swan-song of
British imperial assertiveness, was also that of the traditional Mediterranean naval
power on which Malta’s importance had so largely rested’.77 Taking his analysis still
further, Howe contends that ‘the Suez crisis itself demonstrated that Mintoff ’s main
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bargaining counter, the naval value of Valletta harbour, was one of rapidly diminishing
value’. This argument can be qualified in a number of ways. First, in the aftermath of
the Suez war, the chiefs of staff reaffirmed Malta’s strategic significance, declaring: ‘we
see no reason to reduce the present importance of Malta to NATO in global war’.78 As
regards a limited war, by which the chiefs were referring to Malta’s more traditional
imperial role as a fortress colony, they recorded that ‘the importance of Malta has
increased, because it is likely to be the only secure base from which operations in
the Mediterranean could be mounted’. The following year, the chiefs stated that
there had been ‘no fundamental change in the strategic role of Malta in peace or
war’.79 Malta’s significance was still sufficiently high for Britain to conclude military
and financial agreements with the island on independence in 1964 guaranteeing
base rights.80 As late as 1972 Britain engaged in protracted negotiations to renew
these rights for a further seven years at considerably higher cost.81 Not until 1979
did the final Royal Navy vessel depart from Valletta harbour. Reference has already
been made to the strong doubts about integration which existed from the outset
and preceded the Suez episode. Equally, integration, as we shall see, remained under
active consideration until March 1958, nearly eighteen months after the failed Suez
invasion. If Suez did play a role, it was in fuelling disenchantment with Mintoff as a
partner in the integration endeavour. But even in this regard, strong reservations
about the Maltese premier were being voiced well in advance of the Suez war.
Even before Mintoff became prime minister, Governor Creasy had remarked: ‘I
regard him as “dangerous” in the sense that, if he attained power here, he would
not hesitate to upset Anglo-Maltese relations if he thought that that would pay
him.’82 Shortly after Mintoff became prime minister, Lennox-Boyd expressed ‘disquiet’
about the new premier’s attitude towards financial assistance from Britain, comment-
ing: ‘we cannot agree to consider piecemeal proposals. . .or to rescue Maltese Ministers
from the financial consequences of policies on which they choose to embark on their
own responsibility’.83 By the time of financial talks in London in mid-June 1956 the
colonial secretary’s attitude towards Mintoff had hardened still further: ‘I am
getting rather tired of his methods of doing business, particularly his fondness for
holding a pistol at Her Majesty’s Government’s head. I think we must try to teach
him a lesson on this issue of future financial aid, even at the risk of precipitating a
major political crisis.’84 By the end of the month, Lennox-Boyd provided a devastating
critique:
I think it is not unfair to say [he told Eden] that the main attraction to us of inte-
gration, on the terms proposed by the Round Table Conference, was that it would
provide the essential basis of co-operation between us and the Maltese Government
and thus avoid the endless frictions and frustrations of our past dealings with
Maltese affairs. I have become convinced in these negotiations that Mr. Mintoff
is either unwilling to make or incapable of making his contribution to that co-
operative endeavour. He shows no inclination to compromise on any issue; and
without a spirit of compromise, no scheme of closer association can survive.85
Recapitulating these arguments in a cabinet memorandum, Lennox-Boyd warned
that ‘the implementation of integration may give rise to serious friction in the
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near future if not in the long run’, placing responsibility for this on ‘Mr. Mintoff ’s
erratic and intemperate character’.86 Similarly, the official overseeing the Colonial
Office’s Mediterranean department, Assistant Under-Secretary Eugene Melville,
remarked: ‘I am myself convinced that Integration won’t work – or rather that
Mr. M[intoff] won’t let it work – in a way which is tolerable to us and which pre-
serves our vital interests in Malta.’87 Referring to the contemporaneous Suez crisis,
Melville warned: ‘Mr [M]intoff will see we are on the rack . . . and keep on putting
up the price.’ An example of Mintoff ’s, from the British perspective, untrustworthi-
ness was provided in August 1956 when he ordered Rediffusion Malta, the island’s
broadcasting service, to be suspended. This action, taken after Rediffusion had been
asked by the air authorities to broadcast warnings to fishermen to keep out of the
path of aircraft evacuating British citizens from Egypt to Malta, was criticised by
Governor Laycock for endangering ‘such a vital means of communication in a
time of potential emergency’.88 Later in the month, Mintoff was reported to have
told the Malta Labour Party that the time had now come to deliver a ‘crushing
blow’ to the imperial authorities ‘as never before’.89 Sir Hilton Poynton (deputy
under-secretary of state, Colonial Office) was particularly incensed. ‘The admis-
sion. . .that Mr. Mintoff is deliberately using the Suez crisis and the Cyprus situation
for his own ends’, he fulminated, ‘surely must remove the last possible ground for
thinking that our relations with him can be dealt with on a policy of appease-
ment.’90 Earlier in the year, Eden himself was reported to be ‘very distressed’ at
news of Mintoff ’s invitation of his nemesis, Gamal Abdul Nasser, to Malta, later
confiding that ‘Mintoff falls steadily in my opinion’.91 Disillusionment with
Mintoff was mirrored by a hardening of opinion against integration, especially its
economic aspects.
In a lengthy submission to the cabinet committee on colonial policy of mid-
November 1956, Lennox-Boyd weighed up the pros and cons of economic
equivalence.92 Summarising the objections, he remarked that ‘equivalence is
almost impossible to define satisfactorily; it is extremely doubtful whether the
Maltese productivity could ever rise sufficiently to make equivalence an economic
reality; artificial creation of equivalence might lead to Malta’s economic depression’.
The colonial secretary also warned that
If the principle of equivalence is conceded for Malta, there is a danger that other
claims for privileged treatment will arise in Colonial territories which might think
integration financially worth while [sic], and even in Northern Ireland where U.K.
taxation is fully applied direct and where there is a lesser degree of local autonomy
than proposed for Malta.
Chancellor of the Exchequer Harold Macmillan concurred with Lennox-Boyd’s
arguments, impressing upon his colleagues how ‘extremely undesirable it would be
to associate H.M.G. with the concept of equivalence’.93 In Macmillan’s estimation,
acceptance of equivalence would lead to ‘endless friction’, would ‘constitute a drain
on our limited resources’, and would ‘prejudice any reasonable chance of development
in Malta itself ’. He also called attention to ‘how very favourably’ Malta was treated in
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relation to other colonial territories. To underline his point, he noted that Britain’s aid
to Malta stood at £17.7 per head of population, compared with an average figure of
£0.45 for all colonies. Referring to Mintoff ’s public commitment to equivalence,
Macmillan postulated: ‘I think it is fair to point out that such a unilateral declaration
on his part is a far from happy augury for integration, since it is clearly an attempt to
force us into accepting integration on his own terms, regardless of the consequences
to our own – and indeed the Maltese – economy.’ Macmillan’s successor, Peter
Thorneycroft, was equally sceptical about economic equivalence, declaring that it
would be ‘bound to lead to continued heavy demands upon the Exchequer’ which
would only increase if Malta’s value as a naval base declined.94 Thorneycroft
advised, therefore, that it would be preferable ‘not to commit ourselves to more
than a general undertaking to seek to raise the standard of living in Malta’.
Shortly after becoming prime minister in early 1957 Macmillan reviewed the whole
question of economic equivalence, arguing that the Maltese ‘ought to have the right in
principle to belong to the United Kingdom social structure with contributions appro-
priate to their wage and salary basis, and correspondingly reduced benefits’.95 He
added the further caveat that ‘this would also entail that their taxation system
should be comparable to ours as is the Northern Ireland system, and that they
should bear Imperial taxes as does Northern Ireland’. Clarifying his position still
further at a specially convened meeting of ministers at 10 Downing Street, Macmillan
considered that ‘the United Kingdom and Malta were not at present comparable and
that full economic integration was, therefore, at present impracticable’.96 Relaying the
impasse which had been reached in discussions with Mintoff on the interpretation of
equivalence, Lennox-Boyd informed Governor Laycock that ‘we may have finally
reached real breaking point over whole integration plan on this single issue’.97 The
Commonwealth Relations Office, moreover, reported that Mintoff ’s insistence on
equivalence in wages and social services, regardless of improvements in productivity,
was unacceptable since it amounted to ‘presenting Malta with a blank cheque against
United Kingdom Exchequer’.98 Mintoff, by contrast, refused to countenance the per-
manent constitutional integration of Malta in the absence of an assurance that the
island would achieve economic parity with the United Kingdom within a specified
timeframe.99 By early 1957 it was clear that the policy of integration had stalled. Con-
troversy over changes in Britain’s defence policy expedited its collapse.
The 1957 defence white paper, the origins of which have been traced to reviews set in
train three years earlier,100 heralded a greater reliance on nuclear deterrence and con-
comitant reductions in conventional forces. Such a fundamental change in British
policy inevitably had repercussions for Malta’s defence economy. As the Maltese
deputy prime minister, Ellul Mercer, told Minister of Defence Duncan Sandys,
‘whereas the British economy was not based on defence, in Malta reductions in
defence expenditure attacked the very foundations of the Island’s whole
economy’.101 Lennox-Boyd himself recognised that ‘Malta’s livelihood. . .depends in
a unique way on the dockyard, and if this is to be closed or substantially run down,
Malta faces economic ruin, and could not sustain anything approaching its present
population of 315, 000’.102 For Mintoff, the dockyard was not merely an economic
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issue, but also a political one since its 12,000 workers represented his principal support
base. Seeking to stifle criticism by the Admiralty section of the General Workers’
Union of his handling of the dockyard crisis, as well as put pressure on the British,
Mintoff offered his resignation in December 1957.103 Increasing the stakes still
further, Mintoff introduced a motion in Malta’s legislative assembly which declared
that the Maltese people were ‘no longer bound by agreements and obligations, and
by those so far assumed towards their allies – until the British Government gives a
guarantee that the number of their employees in Malta will not diminish before
there is alternative employment for those discharged’.104 Justifying this drastic
action, Mintoff dwelt on Britain’s alleged failure to honour a commitment made in
July 1955 to avoid unemployment, diversify the economy and raise Maltese standards
of living. He explained the importance which his government placed on the dockyard
issue on the grounds that it was a ‘matter of the daily bread of the people’. The ‘break
with Britain’ motion, as it became known, had profound repercussions on Anglo-
Maltese relations in general, and the integration scheme in particular.
Towards the beginning of 1958 Mintoff expressly told the commander-in-chief for
the Mediterranean, Sir Charles Lambe, that as regards integration he had ‘lost faith in
the British Government’s intentions’ and that this left ‘only the alternative of “Inde-
pendence”’.105 On the eve of Anglo-Maltese talks in London, the first lord of the
Admiralty, Lord Selkirk, observed that ‘the last two or three months have virtually
killed integration dead. Even Alan Lennox-Boyd is tired of haggling’.106 In his
report to the Commons on the March discussions, the colonial secretary averred:
‘Overshadowing the whole of the negotiations was the resolution. . .of 30th December
which Mr Mintoff showed no disposition to withdraw.’107 During the talks them-
selves,108 the colonial secretary had made direct reference to the ‘break with Britain’
motion, telling Mintoff that it was ‘completely unrealistic to imagine H.M.G. in the
U.K. could do anything to put integration into effect while the resolution stood’.
Lord Perth, moreover, stressed the ‘grave damage which had been done in this
country by the passage of the resolution and the way in which it was done’. Mintoff
remained unrepentant. In response to Lennox-Boyd’s contention that, owing to the
resolution, the support he had garnered for integration had ‘disappeared’, the
Maltese premier snapped: ‘if integration was moribund in the U.K. it was dead
in Malta’.
Lennox-Boyd’s forthrightness was no mere negotiating tactic. In cabinet, ministers
recognised that the government’s supporters were ‘deeply divided on the question of
Maltese integration’, and that legislation for the purpose ‘could only be enacted with
the support of the Opposition’.109 Such an undesirable political situation was fore-
closed at the beginning of April 1958 by Mintoff ’s denunciation of integration and
announcement of his intention to seek independence. This had been prefigured in
Lennox-Boyd’s remark on the break-up of the March talks that ‘it is quite on the
cards that he will now plan an anti-British campaign’.110
Announcing on 21 April his government’s intention to resign, Mintoff declared: ‘To
earn the respect of other nations, the Maltese people must show that they are prepared
to fight the battle for their rights with more vigour and greater sacrifices and
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determination than they have shown in the past when fighting other people’s
battles.’111 This clarion call sparked demonstrations which the police struggled to
contain. Matters came to a head on 23 April when Mintoff, who had agreed to con-
tinue in office on a caretaker basis, ordered the withdrawal of mounted police, the ces-
sation of baton charges against demonstrators and the suspension of a number of
senior officers. Governor Laycock immediately countermanded these orders and
accepted the resignation of the Maltese government. In response Mintoff organised
a ‘national day of protest’ on 28 April consisting of strikes, the closure of schools
and businesses and disruption to the island’s communications system. Despite Mint-
off ’s subsequent denials, it is clear that a significant number of the violent acts which
followed were pre-planned.112 Amid mounting disorder, and against the background
of Borg Olivier’s refusal to form an alternative government, Governor Laycock was
given permission on 29 April to declare a state of emergency.113 Over three years of
direct rule followed.
When integration was reconsidered as a possible constitutional solution for smaller
dependencies in 1962, Malta was used to cautionary effect. Assistant under-secretary
of state at the Colonial Office, H. T. Bourdillon, mused: ‘if three Members at Westmin-
ster adapted themselves and became useful Members of the House of Commons, they
would cease to be able to represent the Maltese point of view with conviction’.114
Equally, he continued, ‘if they stayed “Malta-minded” and thus adequately rep-
resented the Maltese point of view, their usefulness at Westminster would have been
confined to the odd one or two hours per year which the House of Commons
devotes directly to Maltese affairs’.115 Drawing wider conclusions from these obser-
vations, Bourdillon stated: ‘The moral of all this is simply that the representation of
distant places in the Parliament at Westminster is no more than a front-arrangement
for public consumption without any real substance in it.’116 A Colonial Office report
produced under the auspices of Permanent Under-Secretary Poynton noted: ‘In
certain circumstances the idea of integration for Malta might be revived, but there
seems no likelihood of this in the immediate future, particularly now that the Nation-
alist Party, which have never supported integration, are returned to power.’117 Indeed,
the victory of Borg Olivier’s party at elections in February 1962 under a new interim
constitution facilitated the achievement of his long-standing vision of Maltese inde-
pendence within the Commonwealth. Former Colonial Office minister, Lord Perth’s,
attempt to revive the concept of integration118 on the eve of the island’s achievement
of independent status fell on deaf ears.
Drawing on the experience of Malta, a conference called in July 1965 to examine
future relations between Britain and the smaller colonies highlighted the complex-
ities of integration, particularly with respect to representation at Westminster and
the standardisation of social services and taxation.119 Recalling the controversy
which had accompanied Malta’s attempted integration into the United Kingdom,
the Labour premier, Harold Wilson, rejected this policy as a solution to the problems
of the smaller Caribbean islands.120 There was also a marked reluctance to counte-
nance integration between Fiji and the United Kingdom when the matter was raised
in 1967 by the Fijian chief minister, Ratu Mara. Summing up British objections, the
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Commonwealth Office noted: ‘if Britain were to agree to integration for one territory
on advantageous terms there would almost certainly be similar demands from about
ten others’.121 By the end of the decade the Labour government revealed a distinct
lack of enthusiasm for closer association when the matter was raised by Major
Peliza, Gibraltar’s chief minister and leader of the rock’s Integration with Britain
Party.122
IV
The attempted incorporation of Malta into the United Kingdom remained unique not
only in terms of the degree of British support for the scheme, but also in how close it
came to succeeding. Initial British backing for integration stemmed from the failure of
the 1947 constitution to create the stability and co-operative environment necessary to
preserve Britain’s imperial interests. Equally, support for integration reflected long-
held British assumptions that Maltese dependency on the metropole ruled out the
achievement of full independence. Mintoff, by contrast, saw integration as a means
by which to raise the living standards of the Maltese to a British level through the doc-
trine of ‘economic equivalence’. The differing objectives of the two sides towards the
integration experiment were central to its ultimate failure. Mintoff ’s determination
to achieve equivalence as the price of integration clashed with the British government’s
concern to restrict its economic and financial liabilities towards Malta. Increasingly
bitter wrangling over the costs of integration poisoned the good will necessary to
bring the scheme to fruition. It was Mintoff ’s ‘break with Britain’ motion at the end
of 1957 which marked the parting of the ways between the two sides. After a period
of direct rule, Malta conformed with a wider pattern of British decolonisation, follow-
ing a conventional path to independence within the Commonwealth by September
1964. In this sense, it was Borg Olivier’s conception of Malta’s future status which pre-
vailed. The attempted integration of Malta was, after all, an aberration in the history of
British decolonisation.
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